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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Judges as Liars" was the title of an essay by Martin Shapiro, a leading political
scientist who studies courts. He argued that courts "occasionally make public policy
decisions or law," but judges cannot admit that they do this because they are
supposed to apply pre-existing law. 1 "Such is the nature of courts. They must
always deny their authority to make law, even when they are making law. One may
call this justificatory history, but I call it lying. Courts and judges always lie. Lying
is the nature of the judicial activity."c
Political scientists regularly assert that judges are deluded or deceptive when they
speak about judging. David Klein, for example, observed that "[j]udges cannot be
expected to understand their own motivations perfectly or to report them with
undiluted candor." 3 Lawrence Baum remarked that "[j]udges usually speak and
write with audiences in mind, and they ordinarily present themselves in a way that
they think will be received favorably. Further, they do not always understand their
goals fully, and they may mislead themselves as well as their audienccs." 4 Political
*Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University School or Law. The ideas
articulated in this Article are more fully developed in Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the
Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press,
forthcoming 2009).
1

Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 155, 155 ( 1994).

2

/d. at 156.

3

DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 13R
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
4

LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 19 (Univ. Michigan Press 1977).
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scientists mean more than that everyone speaks and writes with audiences in mind
and that everyone is self-deluded in various ways; they mean that judges, in
particular and characteristically, put up false fronts and labor under self-delusions.
Even scholars who more generously credit judges with honesty about judging
nonetheless assert that "judicial self-reporting ... is unreliable."'
Political scientists and law professors are not alone in expressing this view of
judges. In a recent book, How Judges Think, Judge Richard Posner wrote that "most
judges are cagey, even coy, in discussing what they do. They tend to parrot an
official line about the judicial process (how rule-bound it is), and often to believe it,
though it does not describe their actual practices.''6
Judges bear some responsibility for perpetuating the belief that they are deluded
or deceptive. They occasionally say things that ring false, like Justice John Roberts'
claim in his Senate confirmation hearing that judging on the Supreme Court is like
calling balls and strikes. But such statements by judges, though memorable and
often repeated, are relatively infrequent. For over a century, long before the
emergence of the legal realists, judges generally have been remarkably candid about
the limitations and uncertainties oflaw and the complexities of judging.
This Article has a single objective: to dispel the notion that judges are deceptive
or deluded about judging. These unwarranted assumptions about judges distort
theoretical and empirical debates about judging. Ordinarily the participants in any
activity are presumed to possess valuable insights about the nature of that activity.
Owing to the assumption that judges are deluded or dishonest, what they say on the
subject ofjudging is often regarded with skepticism, discounted at the outset.
II. JUDGES HAVE LONG ADMITTED THAT THEY MAKE LAW

An accusation frequently leveled against judges must be dispelled at the outset.
As quoted above, Shapiro roundly condemned judges for falsely denying that they
make law. The vehemence of his charge is peculiar given that in a footnote he
quotes Justice Antonin Scalia's assertion that "courts have the capacity to 'make'
law." 7 In a judicial opinion, Scalia openly declared that "[j]udges in a real sense
'make' law." 8 Scalia has repeated a number of times that judges "make the law,"
resolving policy issues in the process. 9 "Indeed, it is probably true that in these
[common law] fields judicial lawmaking can be more freewheeling than ever,"
Scalia wrote, "since the doctrine of stare decisis has appreciably eroded." 10
This was not the first time a political scientist accused judges of denying that
they make law. Charles Grove Haines is a celebrated pioneer in the political science

5
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN
Press 2007).

TilE

U.S. COURTS

OF

APPEALS (Stanford LJniv.

RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES TI!INK 2 (Harvard Uni~. Press 2008).

6

7

Shapiro, supra note I, at 155 nn.3-4 (quoting Anton in Scalia, The Rule o{ Law as a Law
of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1176-77 ( 1989)).
.
8

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Ga., 50 I U.S. 529, 549 ( 1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).

9

Antonin Scalia, Common Law Court in a Civil Law S)'s/em, in A MATTER
INTERPRETATION 3, 6, 9, 12 (Amy Gutmann ed .. Princeton Univ. Press 1997).

OF

10

Id. at 12.
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study of courts. 11 His 1922 article, "General Observations on the Effects of Personal,
Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges," is considered a
seminal piece in the tield. 1c Haines claimed that judges widely believe in this set of
views: "The mechanical theory which postulates absolute legal principles, existing
prior to and independent of all judicial decisions. and merely discovered and applied
by courts, has been characterized as a theory of a 'judicial slot machine."' 11
Contemporary legal historian G. Edward White has labeled this the "oracular" theory
of judging: "the dominant understanding of judicial decision-making treated it as an
exercise in 'finding' rather than 'making' law, with 'law' being conceived as a body
of finite and immutable principles that existed independent of its interpreters." 14
Legal historians and theorists attach the label "legal formalism" to this set of ideas,
asserting that it dominated the legal culture from the I g70s through the 1920s. 15
The problem with these claims is that judges at the time frequently said the
opposite-openly admitting that they make law. Haines' own article quotes Lord
Mellish for writing in an 1875 judicial opinion that "[t]he whole of the rules of
equity and nine-tenths of the rules of common law, have in fact been made by the
judges." 16 Lord Mellish made this statement almost fitly years before Haines
asserted that courts "clung to" the belief that they merely declared preexisting law.
Judge Benjamin Cardozo's celebrated book, The l\'ature of the Judicial Process.
which came out a year before Haines' article, included a chapter entitled "The Judge
as Legislator." Cardozo wrote that "[ o]bscurity of statute or of precedent or of
customs or of morals. or collision between some or all of them. may leave the law
unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it retroactively in the exercise of
a power frankly legislative in function.'' 17
Prominent judges had said this decades earlier (as the quote from Lord Mellish
attests to). Judge Thomas M. Cooley, one of the nation's most renowned judges,
asserted in 1886 that "[t]he decisions continue to accumulate as causes arise which
present aspects differing at all from any which preceded; and a great body of laws

11
Nancy Maveety, The Stud\' of Judicial Behavior and Political
the Disci11/ine
Scienci!,
of
in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR I, 2-3 (Nancy Maveety ed .. Univ. Michigan Press
2003).

12

Jd. at 8.

13

Charles Grove Haines. General Ohsen·ationsEff'ects
011 !hi!of'
Pasonal. Political, and
Economic Influences in the Decisions o(.Judges. 17 ILL. L. Rl V. %. 97 ( 1922 ).
14
G. EDWARD WHITE. THF AMERICAN Jl!IJIC!AL TRADITION: PROFIII'.S
AMERICAN JUDGES viii-ix (3d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2007).

OF

LEADIN<;

15

In other works. 1 have argued that this accepted comentional view of the period is
flawed. See. e.g .. Brian Z. Tamanaha. U11derstanding ri!gal Rmlism, 87 Tr-x. L. Rr.v.
(forthcoming 2009); Brian Z. Tamanaha. The Bogus Tale the
Ahmtl
Legal Formalists (St.
John's Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series. Paper #08-0130. 2008).
available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1123498.
161-!aines, supra note 13. at I 00 n.l5 (quoting Allen v . .Jackson. ( 1875) I Eng. Rep. 399,
405 (Ch. D.) (Mellish. L.J )).

17 BENJAMIN

N. CARDOZO. Till NA ILRic

OF

THE .ll!Dil'IAL PROCESS 128 (I st cd. Yale Univ.

Press 1921 ).
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being made under the statute which is and can be nothing but 'judge-made law.'" 1H
Unanticipated situations regularly arise, lacking any clear preexisting determinative
legal rule. In such cases, Cooley continued, "it is evident that what the law was to be
could not have been known in advance of decisions, and it is also evident that when
declared by the court its effect must be retroactive." 19 .Judge John F. Dillon wrote in
the same year that "stupendous work of judicial legislation has been silently going
on" for a "long period" 20 ; and "it is no longer denied, nor can it be, that the
judges ... are actually, though indirectly, engaged in legislating." 21 In a 1903 article
with the "tell all" title ''Judge-Made Law." Judge A.M. Mackey matter-of-factly
wrote that "a large portion of the unwritten or common law is judge-made law." 22
U. S. Circuit Judge Le Baron Colt wrote, also in I 903, that judges "have carried on
judicial legislation from the infancy of the law in order that it might advance with
society." 23
To be sure, judges also can be found asserting that courts "make no laws, they
establish no policy, they never enter into the domain of popular action," as Justice
Brewer insisted in an 1893 speech. 24 That is the standard line demarking the proper
role of judges. Sometimes it was offered by judges as a statement of the ideal,
sometimes as a descriptive claim about what judges do, often with an eye on
defending or bolstering judicial legitimacy. "Judicial power is never exercised for
the purpose of giving etiect to the will of the judge," wrote Chief Justice John
Marshall nearly two centuries ago. "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the
power of laws, has no existence ... Courts are mere instruments of law, and can will
nothing. " 25
But when judges provide reflective accounts of judging, as Cardozo did, they
typically have not denied that on occasion they make law. Judge Cooley and Judge
Dillon were among the most prominent judges of the late Nineteenth century. Both
judges asserted that judicial legislation is necessary to keep the law in sync with the
times, and furthermore that it is inevitable that judges must make law when
confronted with unanticipated situations that the existing law (cases and statutes)
does not provide for. 26 With no sign of delusion or deception, well before the arrival
of the legal realists, these judges expressed very realistic views about law and
judging.
IRThomas M. Cooley, Another Vie1,1· of' Codification, 2 COLUM. JURIST 465, 466 (1886)
(emphasis added).
19

/d. at 465.

20

John F. Dillon, Codification, 20 AM. L.

REV.

l, 32 (1886).

21

JOHN F. DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THf' UNITicD STATES 267-68 (Little, Brown
and Co. 1894) (emphasis added).
22
23

A. M. Mackey, Judge-Made Law, 2 OKLA. L. J. 193, 197 ( 1903).
Le Baron B. Colt, Law and Reasonableness, 37 AM. L.

REV.

657 ( 1903).

24

G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L.
David P. Brewer).
25

REV.

L 46 (2005) (quoting

0sbom v. Bank of U.S., 22 US (9 Wheaton) 738, 866 (I R24 ).

26

See Cooley, Another View of Codification, supra note IR; DILLON, supra note 21,
Lectures XI, XII, and XIII.
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Ill. JUDGES HAVE LONG ADMITTED THAT LAW CAN BE UNCERTAIN, THAT THERE
ARE GAPS IN THE LAW, AND THAT PRECEDENTS MAY CONFLICT
Haines suggested in his portrayal that judges believed that law was
comprehensive and logically consistent, and that judges mechanically decided cases
though logical deduction. But what judges repeatedly said about the law is contrary
to this portrayal. Judge Dillon, in 1886, candidly detailed the legal uncertainty
judges at the time faced:
It is manifest from the foregoing discussion, that the Judges from the very
nature of their functions, can not develop the general principles of the law
so as to take in the entire subject, or do anything except (if you will
pardon the expression) automatically (that is depending upon the accident
of cases arising for judicial action) towards giving anything like
completeness to the law or any branch of it. Not only is the case law
incomplete. but the MUL TIPLICTY AND CONFLICT OF DECISIONS
is one of the most fruitful cases of the unnecessary uncertainty, which
characterizes the jurisprudence of England and America. Thousands of
decisions are reported every year. An almost unlimited number can be
found upon almost any subject. What any given case decides, must be
deduced trom a careful examination ofthe exact facts, and ofthe positive
legislation, if any. applicable thereto. A general principle will be found
adjudged by cet1ain courts. Other courts deny or doubt the soundness of
the principle. Exceptions are gradually but certainly introduced. Almost
every subject is overrun by a more than tropical redundancy of decisions,
leaving the most patient investigator entangled in doubt. 27

This luxuriant muddle was made worse, Dillon added, because legislation was
"irregular and fragmentary," and often poorly drafted. 28
Judge Seymour D. Thompson, the long time editor of the leading American Law
Review, gave an address to the Georgia Bar in 1889 that exposed the extensive legal
uncertainty judges were faced with. After detailing the situation in several areas of
law, he asserted that "the jumble through which I have just conducted you, though
full of legal technicality, is utterly destitute of any element of certainty; and every
title of law abounds in such labyrinths." 29 Thompson then articulated an argument
(in 1889) that would be identitied with the much later legal realists and Critical
Legal Studies 30-that there are exceptions for legal rules and principles which can be
invoked at any time:
Again, take the general proposition that a request is necessary to raise an
implied promise. This is reiterated in many legal judgments. But it is

27

Dillon, supra note 20, at 29. 36 (emphasis in original).

28/d.
29

Seymour D. Thompson, More Justice and Less Technicality. 23 AM. L. REv. 22, 44
(1889).
30
See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Studies, 10 LEGAL Snm. F. 335, 338 ( 1986)
(describing the indeterminacy thesis of CLS in terms reminiscent of Judge Thompson's
description of the state of the law).
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easily shown that in many cases the law will imply a promise where there
has been no request: but in what cases it will imply it and what not, who
can tell? Similar doubts and infirmities seem to permeate every title of
our case-made law. 11
In an 1890 address to the Kansas Bar, Judge Thomas Ewing estimated that in
about forty percent of his cases "the decisions [precedents] conflict, and a large
weight of reason and authority is found on both sides." 12 "In these doubtful cases,"
Ewing asked rhetorically, "who shall weigh them by reason, when the questions may
be of mere arbitrary law. Who shall \Veigh them by conscience, when they may
present no conflict solvable by the moral sense?" 33 President of the American Bar
Association, Judge Uriah Milton Rose, remarked in his 1902 address that, owing to
the proliferation of cases, judges have "discretion ... in deciding cases ... ; for our
courts can generally find precedents for almost any proposition." 34 Judge Oscar
Fellows, in 1912, conveyed the sense of being overwhelmed by this mass of cases,
remarking:
The reported decisions in all our states so enormously multiply that the
lawyer's problem is not so much where to find the law as to weigh and
estimate the value of what he discovers. It is in truth more than ever "the
lawless science of the law, the countless myriad of precedents." 35
Chief J usticc Albert Savage of the Maine Supreme Court, in 1914, acknowledged
that cases arise in which authority can be found on both sides or precedent is lacking,
"[a]nd it would be contrary to all human experience to say that his temperament and
his predictions may not give color to his conception [of the law]." 36 Writing in 1922,
Judge Charles M. Hough confirmed the presence of a "not inconsiderable number of
causes wherein precedents are not ruling. where the statute or constitution does not
directly and plainly cover, and where the Court has to deal with something previous
lawmakers had not thought of, and therefore did not speak of." 37
Judge Irving
Lehman delivered a rctlective speech at Cornell Law School in 1924 stating that
judges are sometimes confronted with contlicting precedents, or erroneous
precedents. or indeed no precedents, and that they must sometimes change the law
for reasons of public policy.'' As a law student he came to realize that "[l]aw was
not an exact science founded upon immutable principles": upon becoming a judge,

31

See Thompson, supra note 29. at 47-4X.

"Thomas Ewing, Cudi/ication, 41 A.Ul. LJ. 439, 440
X90).
(I

''!d.
1-IU.M. Rose. ilmericun Bur Associorion, 64

ALB.

L.J. 333, 336 ( 1902).

''Oscar F. l·ellows, The Mu!rip!icifr of Reported Dccisiom, 6 ME. L. REV. 263, 264
( 1912).
1

''Alhert R. Savage. Some Sore Spurs. 7 ME. L RlV. 29, 3 7 ( 1913 ).

"( "h:ulcs M. Hough, Book Rn icH"I, 7 c, JRi\loLL L.

RFV.

-'''Irving Lehman, The lnf/lwnce ofon
rhe [)nil·cnirin
LQ I ( 1924).
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he "realized that in many cases there were no premises from which any deductions
could be drawn with logical certainty." 19
Almost all of the above observations were uttered by judges before the legal
realists began their campaign to dispel the purported delusions and pretensions of
40
judges.
Recent generations of judges have been equally explicit. Supreme Court
Justice William 0. Douglas, for example, remarked that "there are usually plenty of
precedents to go around; and with the accumulation of decisions, it is not a great
problem for the lawyer to find legal authority for most propositions." 41 Judge
Patricia Wald acknowledged that sometimes conflicting lines of precedent exist,
allowing judges to "follow those precedents which they like best," 42 and she admitted
that judges can ignore or distinguish away precedents they do not like when the
precedents are not precisely on point. 43
IV. JUDGES HAVE LONG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MUST SOMETIMES MAKE
CHOICES, AND THAT THEIR PERSONAL VIEWS SOMETIMES COLOR THEIR DECISIONS

Another charge made against judges is that they are deluded or deceptive in
denying that their personal values have any role in their decisions. Haines suggested
this when writing that "[ d]ue to the general acceptance of this view by the legal
fraternity, it has become a habit of those trained in law to bestow little attention upon
their individual views or prejudices and to turn attention instead to precedents which
are regarded as forming the authoritative basis of the law." 44 While it is correct that
judges typically assert that the law determines the bulk of their decisions, it is wrong
to suggest that judges deny that their values have any influence their decisions.
Again the best known counter-example is Judge Cardozo. He insisted that judges
should base their decisions on the moral or policy position of the community, rather
than the judge's personal views. The judge's duty is to be careful to bring into the
law "not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies, but the aspirations
and philosophies and convictions of the men and women of my time." 45 Judges must
strive to shape the law to conform to the "mores of their day," consistent with
"customary morality," 4" which might not coincide with the judges' own moral views.
But Cardozo recognized that it is extremely difficult for judges to keep these apart.
"No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the

39

!d. at 2-3.

40

According to conventional accounts, the realists emerged in the mid-1920s and 1930s.
For a critique and reconstruction of this standard view of legal realism, see Brian Z.
Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, Tex. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
41

William 0. Douglas, S I ARE
19 (1963).

DECISIS, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDb,NCE FROM

THE COLUMBIA

LAW REVIEW

42
Patricia M. Wa1d, Changing Course: The Use ol Precedent in the District of Co/umhia
Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 4 77, 4R I ( 1986 ).

43

/d. at 490.

44

Haines, supra note 13. at 97-98.

45

/d. at 173.

46

!d. at 135, 136.
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empire of these subconscious loyalties."47 "The perception of objective right takes
the color of the subjective mind. The conclusions of the subjective mind take the
color of customary practices and objectified beliefs. There is constant and subtle
interaction between what is without and what is within." 48 Hence, Cardozo
concluded, the distinction between the judge's subjective views of the right and the
community's general view "is shadowy and evanescent." 49
Other judges at the time also acknowledged that personal values may influence
judicial decisions. In a positive review of the book, Judge Hough affirmed
Cardozo's account of the difficulty of maintaining the appropriate separation
between "the subjective or individual conscience, and the objective or general
conscience; and to indicate how far each can rightly sway judicial decision." 50 In a
1924 speech, Chief Judge Frank Harris Hiscock (who sat on the same court with
Cardozo) reviewed a string of recent decisions and declared: "All of these cases
could have been decided the other way." 51 He told his audience that constitutional
questions about rights and liberties that courts are called upon to decide are less
questions of law than "of policy and state craft." 52 Hence, rulings are a function of
the "policy and viewpoint of a court," which can change when the membership
changes. 53 Another colleague on the New York high court, Judge Irving Lehman,
observed that "no thoughtful judge can fail to note that in conferences of the court,
differences of opinion are based at least to some extent upon differences of
viewpoint"q; and "it is inevitable that a judge in weighing individual rights as
opposed to collective benefit will to some extent be influenced by his personal
•
,<;.:;;
views .... ·
Judges continued to make these points in subsequent decades, as the following
sampling of statements shows. Associate Justice Horace Stem of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, f()r example, wrote in the 1937 Harvard Law Review:
however fondly we may like to delude ourselves into the belief that
constitutional law is a pure science, the interpretation and evolution of
which are wholly independent of political predilections, we must, if
realists, recognize that courts controlled by a 'conservative' personnel and
those dominated by a 'liberal' membership are more than likely to decide
constitutional questions from different angles and with different results. 56
47
4

!d. at 175.

~/d at 1!0-11.

49

/datl!O.

50

/d. at289.

51

frank Harris Hiscock, Progressiveness of New York Law,

CoRNELL

L.Q. 371, 376

(1924).
52

!d. at 381.

"!d. at374.
54

Lehman, supra note 38, at 6.

55

/d. at 12.

56

1-lorace Stern. Book Reviews, 51 HARV. L.. REV.
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Justice Bernard L. Shientag, sitting on an intermediate appellate court of New
York State, gave the Benjamin Cardozo Lecture in 1944, published as a book with
the descriptive title: The Personality of the Judge (and the Part it Plays in the
Administration ofJustice). Shientag emphasized that the personality and beliefs of
judges matter, and that judges vary in personalities and attitudes-some thoughtful
and fair, others tyrannical, impatient, or close-minded 57 :
Naturally, it is in cases where the creative faculty of the judicial process
operates, where there is a choice of competing analogies, that the
personality of the judge, the individual tone of his mind, the color of his
experiences, the character and variety of his interests and his
prepossessions, all play an important role. For the judge, in effect, to
detach himself from his whole personality, is a difticult, if not an
impossible, task. We make progress, therefore, when we recognize this
condition as a part of the weakness of human nature. 5x
Federal Circuit Judge Amistead Dobie in 1951 observed that, contrary to former
"Utopian" dreams, a judge must deal with an imperfect legal order:
There never has been, and there never will be. a judge worthy of his salt
who can be classified as a cool and clammy thinking machine. No judge,
however he may try, can, in his decisions, completely and effectively
divorce himself from what he has seen, has heard, has experienced and
has been. 59
Federal Appellate Judge Calvert Magruder candidly remarked in 1958 that ''[a ]II too
often we have to realize that the case might be written up either way, in a lawyer-like
opinion. The judge may not recognize that this is so. or even be conscious of the
inner springs that led him to choose one result rather than the other." 60
In a 1959 article by Federal Circuit Judge Albert Tate entitled "The Judge as a
Person," Tate took it as obvious that judges' views influence their decisions, and he
offered advice to lawyers, perhaps surprising coming from a judge, that they should
tailor their argument in ways calculated to appeal to the particular judge or judges
who will hear their case. 61 "[L]ike all other human beings [judges] have limitations
of vision, knowledge, intelligence, or predisposition which sometimes influence their
judicial actions, however much they conscientiously try to avoid the occasion of
error. " 62 Tate hastened to add that in the "vast and overwhelming majority of cases
the same result will be reached" regardless of who sits on the case, but he also

57

Bernard L. Shientag, THE PERSm<ALITY

58

/d. at 51.

59

Ami stead D. Dobie. A Judge Judges Judges, 1951

6

OF THE JL:m<E

73 ( 1944 ).

WASH.

U. L.Q. 471, 480 ( 1951 ).

°Calvert Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations ol an intermediate Appellate Court. 44

CORNELL
61

L.Q. I, 5 ( 1958).

Albert Tate, Jr., The Judge as a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 4JX, 439 ( 1959).

62/d.
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admitted that cases arise in which "several judges may with equal sincerity and equal
reason reach different results." 63
In a 1962 address at the University of Chicago Law School, Justice Roger
Traynor of the California Supreme Court, one of the leading common law judges of
his generation, confirmed that judges must make choices in certain situations. 64
Traynor admitted that there are cases in which the decision can go either way 65 ; he
accepted that judges have predilections that they must struggle to overcome (or be
conscious ot), 66 and wrote that the judge must "arrive at last at a value judgment as to
what the law ought to be and to spell out why." 67 Also in 1962, Judge Henry
Friendly wrote that
the judge should try to make sure he is interpreting the long term
convictions of the community rather than his own evanescent ones; but we
may was well recognize this goal will not always be realized even "by the
best." Sometimes the judge will fail of this because the community has
no true convictions ... on other occasions because it is asking too much
that a judge suppress the basic beliefs by which he lives. 68
"The Limits of Judicial Objectivity" was the title of a 1963 lecture delivered at
the law school at American University by Federal Circuit Judge Charles Clark, the
former Dean of Yale Law School. In the small percentage of open cases where law
is unclear (he mentioned Cardozo's rough estimate of about ten percent legally
uncertain cases" 9 ), Clark wrote, the judge (after becoming as prepared and
knowledgeable as he can) "is on his own for the ultimate result which must reflect
his background, his personality, and his inner conviction." 70 In these genuinely open
legal questions, "judicial objectivity" does not get a judge very far, according to
Clark. The judge has no choice but to make a decision "where there is no one and
nothing to tell him how or where to go." 71 Justice Walter Schaefer of the Illinois
Supreme Court published an article in the 1966 Chicago Law Review which likewise
asserted that the "great bulk" of cases are determined by legal rules and principles. 72
But in a small subset of cases, judges must grapple with legally uncertain questions
and must make policy decisions. Like Cardozo, Schaefer asserted that policy
63

/d. at 440.

64

Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make Good
Law, 29 U. Cm L. REv. 223 ( 1962).
65

/d. at 224.

66

/d. at 234.

67 /d.

xHenry J. Friendly, Reactions of" a Lmt:ver-New~v Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 231
( 1961 ).
6

11

" Charles E. Clark, The Limits olludicial Objectivity, 12 AM. U. L. REV. I, 4 (1963)
(citation omitted).

70

/d. at 12.

71

/d. at 10.

7

cWalter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Polic:v. 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 ( 1966 ).
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decisions ought to be based upon community views and not the judge's own view, 73
but he recognized the difficulty of keeping the two apart. "There is nothing new in
the notion that the personality of the judge plays a part in the decision of cases." 74
Additional examples from past judges can be otTered, but enough has been
conveyed above to demonstrate that judges have expressed consummately realistic
views about judging for a long time. Highly respected contemporary judges have
made similar statements.
Judge Jon Newman wrote that "I am not so nai"ve as to deny that some judges in
some cases permit personal predilections to determine the result. The equities
sometimes matter, the rule of law is sometimes bent." 75 Judge Alex Kozinski, a selfproclaimed legalist, declared: "judges do in fact have considerable discretion in
certain of their decisions" 76 ; with legal principles "there is frequently some room for
the exercise of personal j udgment" 77 ; "[p ]recedent ... frequently leaves room for
judgment" 78 ; " [ w ]e all view reality from our own peculiar perspective; we all have
biases, interests, leanings, instincts" 79 ; and "[i]t is very easy to take sides in a case
and subtly shade the decision-making process in favor of the party you favor .... " 80
Judge Harry Edwards acknowledged that in very hard cases with no clear right legal
answer, "it may be true that a judge's views are influenced by his or her political or
ideological beliefs." 81
Judge Patricia Wald forthrightly stated that "the judge's political orientation will
affect decision-making." 82 "I would be nai"ve to suggest that all judges reason
alike," 83 she wrote.
How could they, given their different backgrounds, experiences,
perceptions, and former involvements, all of which are part of the
intellectual capital they bring to the bench. The cumulative knowledge,

73

Jd. at 14.

74

Jd. at 22.

75

Jon O. Newman, Be/ween Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 CALL. REV. 200,204 (1984).
76
Alex Kozinski. What I Ate ji>r Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision
Making, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 993, 994 ( 1992). Although Kozinski takes a hard line on

strictly following the law when it is clear, he admits that on occasion his personal views have
influenced his decisions. See Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFFAIRS, available at
http://www .I egalatTai rs. org/ issues/Jan urary- February-2004/feature_ bazelon.
77

Kozinski, supra note 76, at 996.

78

/d. at 997.

79/d.

sold.
81

Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 854 ( 1991 ).
82
Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging As Gleaned From One Hundred Years of
the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, I 00 HARV. L. REV. 887, 895 ( 1987).

83

Patricia M. Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W.VA. L. REV. I, 12 ( 1984).
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experience, and internal bents that are in us are bound to influence our
notions of how a case is to be decided." 84
Judge Wald expressed "something of a ho-hum reaction to the notion that judges'
personal philosophies enter into their decisionmaking when statute or precedent does
not point their discretion in one direction or constrain it in another . . . . In such
cases personal philosophies may well play a significant role in judging." 85 "But how
could it be otherwise?" asks Judge Wald. 86
An essential lesson lies in the many realistic accounts of judging offered by
judges: the judges did not think that the inherent limitations of law and (human)
judges necessarily defeats their appointed task to render legal decisions. Even as
judges freely acknowledge that law can be uncertain and that the influence of their
subjective values cannot be entirely screened out, they also uniformly insist that a
substantial proportion of the time their decisions are consistent with and determined
by the law. Judge Newman declared:
The ordinary business of judges is to apply the law as they understand it
to reach results with which they do not necessarily agree. They do this
every day. Distasteful statutes are declared constitutional and applied
according to the legislators' evident intent; unwise decisions of
administrative agencies are enforced; trial court rulings within the trial
judge's discretion are upheld even though the reviewing judge would
surely have ruled to the contrary; precedents of the local jurisdiction are
followed that would be rejected as an initial proposition. 87
Judge Kozinski repeated what many judges have said, that notwithstanding the
ample room for discretion and judgment, judges are "subject to very significant
constraints," and can try to become aware of and attempt to counter the influence of
their biases. ox
While judges routinely admit the presence of ideological influence on decisions,
they also consistently maintain that it comes into play in a relatively small proportion
of cases. Judge Wald estimated that difficult judgments must be made in about
fifteen percent of the cases. 89 Judge Edwards similarly estimated that about five to
fifteen percent of appellate cases are very hard, with equally strong competing legal
arguments. "Disposition of this small number of cases, then, requires judges to
exercise a measure of discretion, drawing to some degree on their own social and
moral beliefs." 90 Beginning with Cardozo, a long string of appellate judges have
offered a similar estimate of the high percentage of cases with legally clear

R4Jd.
85

Patricia Wald, A Re.1ponse to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L.
(emphasis added).

REV.

235, 236 ( 1999)

86

ld. at 250.

87

Newman, supra note 75, at 204.

88

Kozinski, supra note 76, at 994.

89

Wald, supra note 85, at 236 & n.6.

90

Edwards, supra note 81, at 857.
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outcomes, wherein one result can be ranked as stronger on legal terms than any other
outcome. In support of their estimate, judges can point to the fact that federal
appellate courts have historically rendered unanimous decisions about ninety percent
ofthe time.
Extending back for more than a century, judges have uniformly expressed a
balanced realistic view about judging, maintaining that they follow the law in the
substantial propmiion of cases where the legal result is clear, and in the remaining
cases they do the best they can to arrive at the strongest legal answer. No more can
be asked or expected of a rule of law system manned by human judges.
V. THE BALANCED REALISM OF JUDGE RICHARD POSNER

No account of the realism of contemporary judges can neglect Judge Richard
Posner. He is renowned for uttering bluntly realistic comments about judging. His
review of the Rehnquist Court had the unadorned title "A Political Court." 91 His
recent summa on judging, How Judges Think, contains many dramatically realistic
assertions: "[s]o judging is political."92 Posner declared:
Because the materials of legalist decision making fail to generate
acceptable answers to all the legal questions that American judges are
required to decide, judges perforce have occasional-indeed rather
frequent-recourse to other sources of judgment, including their own
political opinions or policy judgments, even their idio~yncrasies. As a
result, law is shot through with politics and with much else besides that
does not fit a legalist model of decision making. 93
Judge Posner might be considered unique among his judicial brethren in his
realistic views of judging. This is a misperception (although his outspokenness and
prolific output on the topic are unparalleled), as the many realistic statements by
judges about judging reproduced in this Article demonstrate. Everything Posner says
about the uncertainties and openness of law and the limitations of human judges has
been said by prominent judges before, many times over.
Another potential misimpression must be cleared up about Judge Posner: he is
not a skeptic about the substantial role law plays in judging, although it is easy to get
this misimpression from the above quotes. Like other judges, Posner carefully
circumscribes the scope of his comments about politics and ideology to apply to the
relatively small proportion of legally uncertain cases. 94 Judges are regularly
confronted with "open areas," he asserts, "in which the orthodox (the legalist)
methods of analysis yield unsatisfactory and sometimes no conclusions, thereby
allowing or even dictating that emotion, personality, policy intuitions, ideology,
politics, background, and experience will determine a judge's decision." 95
"But," Posner cautions:

91

Richard A. Posner, A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005).

92

PoSNER, supra note 6, at 369.

93

!d. at 9.

94

Jd. at II, 82.

95

!d. at 11.
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[J]udging is not just personal and political. It is also impersonal and
nonpolitical in the sense that many, indeed most, judicial decisions really
are the product of a neutral application of rules not made up for the
occasion to facts fairly found.
Such decisions exemplify what is
commonly called 'legal formalism,' though the word I prefer is "routine."
"[M]ost cases are routine," 96 he repeats, and the "routine cases are those that can be
decided by legalist techniques." 97 Posner also reminds us that the vast bulk of
disputes never make it into court because the expected legal outcome is clear, and a
substantial majority of judicial decisions are not appealed "because the case is
'controlled' by precedent or clear statutory language.''n
Although easily overlooked beneath his attention-grabbing skeptical assertions,
Posner has consistently said this for many years: "the social interest in certainty of
legal obligations requires the judge to stick pretty close to statutory text and judicial
precedent in most cases and thus to behave, much of the time anyway, as a
formalist." 99 A substantial proportion of time, he says, judges duly adhere to
precedent because they have internalized this in their role as judges. 100 Most judges
strive to live up to the conventional standards of judging for their own self-esteem,
and to earn the accolades and respect of their judicial colleagues and legal
audiences. 101 A "willful" judge is a badjudge, 102 and judges don't want to be seen as
bad at what they do. "The business of judges is to enforce the law," 103 Posner
repeats, and that is what judges do.
Few people would have the temerity to assert that Judge Posner is deluded or
deceptive about judging. Yet what Posner says about judging comports with what
judges have been saying for many decades. Thus, again, it is wrong to assert that
judges typically have been deluded or deceptive about judging. Judges admit that
they make law, that they make choices, that they make policy decisions, that a
different decision can sometimes be justified, and that sometimes their personal
values have any impact on their decisions. Judges have admitted all of this many
times over.
VI. WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THE BALANCED REALISM OF JUDGES
Our contemporary legal culture is increasingly saturated with skepticism about
judges and judging. 104 This skepticism is reflected in and fed by the explosion of

96

97

!d. at 46.
ld.

98
99

at 76, 373.

ld. at 44-45.
RICHARD

A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMA TICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL TIIEORY 209 (1999).

IOOJd.

at45, 61, 71, 125,145.

IOIJd.

at 61, 71.

102
103

ld. at 112.
ld. at 213.

104

The development is explored in BRIAN
THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006).
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quantitative studies of judging now coming out in law reviews and political science
journals which aim to prove that judicial decisions are influenced by the political
views of judges. 105 Judges have recently engaged in contentious debates with
political scientists and law professors over the validity and implications of these
studies. 106
Owing to the belief that judges are deluded or deceptive about judging, it is easy
to dismiss what judges say on the subject as untrustworthy. This is a mistake.
Judges as a group have been neither deluded nor duplicitous about what is involved
in the process of judging. It is time to get over this dismissive notion and pay
attention to what they are saying, for they offer a font of reliable information about
what is involved in judging. Judges have acknowledged the openness of law and
their frailty as humans, but steadfastly maintain that this reality does not prevent
them from carrying out their charge to make decisions in accordance with the law to
the best oftheir ability. This insight is born of and supported by experience.

105
For a cnt1que of these studies, see Brian Z. Tamanaha. The Distorting Slant ol
Quantitative Studies olJudging, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
106

See Wald, supra note 85, at 236 n.6; Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, A Modest
Reply to Judge Wald, 99 COLUM L. REV. 262 ( 1999); Harry Edwards, Collegialitv and
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998); Richard L. Revesz,
Ideology. Collegiality. and the D.C. Circuit: A Repll' to Chiej"Judge Hany T. Edwards, 85
VA. L. REV. 805 ( 1999); Harry T. Edwards and Linda Elliott, Beware ol Numbers (and
Unsupported Claims ol Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards: A Case in Point', 80 WASil. U. L.Q. 1275 (2002).
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